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March 13, 1953


MEMORANDUM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD:

SUBJECT: Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death.

Transmitted herewith is a revised text of a draft plan on Stalin's death for consideration at the Board's meeting on March 19th. As instructed, I have consolidated written and oral comments in this revision. Since no editing was authorized, the paper still shows the diffuseness and some of the imperfect coherence which were due to its hasty preparation.

I would like to stress particularly the importance of assumption 3 d. on page 2. It was the thought of the drafting group that the main value of the contemplated speech would hinge upon its embodying a new policy initiative as distinguished from a novel appeal based on existing policies. Only the most careful precautions in this regard seem likely to prevent the new offensive from being discounted as "psychological warfare".

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Acting Director.

Enclosure:

Draft Outline, Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death.

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March 13, 1953

DRAFT OUTLINE

PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLOITATION OF STALIN'S DEATH

PART I INTRODUCTION

1. Problem

a. The problem is to devise a plan of psychological operations as one part of a comprehensive and decisive program for the exploitation of Stalin's death and the transfer of power to new hands in order to make real progress toward our national objectives.

b. No once-for-all psychological plan is possible in the present situation. Psychological operations, like other actions, must be capable of rapid and flexible adjustment to changes in the situation. Therefore, a strong, high-level, continuing interdepartmental working group should be especially constituted to keep psychological plans and operations under continuous review and in harmony with national policy.

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2. Basic Considerations

a. Psychological operations by themselves cannot have sufficient impact on the Soviet system to produce those changes which we would regard as real progress toward our national objectives. They can only contribute to the success of diplomatic, political, military, and economic actions taken by the United States Government, or aggravate stresses which emerge within the Soviet system itself. They should be fully geared into a comprehensive and decisive program for the exploitation of Stalin's death.

b. It is beyond the scope of this paper to say what the elements of such a program should be. However, it has been essential in drawing up this plan of psychological operations to make certain assumptions about national policy. The assumptions adopted for the purposes of this paper are set forth in paragraph 3 below. If these assumptions are in error, the plan for psychological operations will have to be adjusted accordingly.

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3. Assumptions

a. It is assumed that the fundamental objectives of the United States with respect to the Soviet system remain as stated in the relevant National Security Council papers, namely, NSC 20/4, NSC 68, NSC 114, and NSC 135. In essence, these fundamental objectives are:

(1) To bring about a retraction of Soviet power and influence from the satellites and Communist China and thus a reduction of Soviet power and influence in world affairs;

(2) to bring about a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system--which would be reflected above all in the conduct of international relations by the Soviet regime in a manner consistent with the spirit and purpose of the United Nations Charter.

b. It is assumed that the United States Government intends to exploit to the full the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and the difficulties inherent in the transfer of power to make progress toward these ends.

c. It is assumed that the United States Government will undertake a comprehensive and decisive program of action--involving whatever diplomatic, political, military, and economic measures are appropriate and are within our capabilities--to make real progress toward our national objectives and that this plan for psychological operations, as revised from time to time is part of this massive and integrated campaign.

d. Finally, it is assumed that the initial major move in this national campaign will be a Presidential speech outlining a United States program for peace/~~and possibly proposing an early high-level meeting to consider certain major outstanding issues.~~ This will be intended as a serious move which will, we hope, lead to serious negotiations for adjustment of these issues. It follows, therefore, that the move must be treated and built up as a serious effort on the part of the United States to make progress toward a peaceful world.

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3/13/534. Psychological Estimate of the Situation*

a. It has long been estimated that one of the most promising opportunities to make real progress toward our national objectives with respect to the Soviet system would arise following the death of Stalin. The inescapable necessity of transferring power to new hands, no matter how careful the preparations for it, has created a time of crisis for the Soviet Union and the Soviet system as a whole. We should not be misled by the apparently smooth transfer of power. A despotism can be ruled only by a despot and history is strewn with unsuccessful efforts to replace a tyrant with a committee. There is a real question whether Malenkov (or anyone else) will be able to bring or maintain all of the power factors under his iron control as Stalin did.

b. Among the facts which have already emerged, the following are of particular significance in developing a program of psychological operations designed to support our national effort to make progress toward our objectives:

(1) The accession to power of the new regime has been executed in a dramatically rapid and apparently resolute manner. This development and the announced changes in governmental structure, indicate careful preparation and premeditation.

(2) The reorganization of the party and governmental apparatus is on lines almost identical to the organization employed during World War II. This points clearly to an effort to concentrate power in a manageably small number of hands and to present, both internally and externally, an impression of hardness and unity and continuity at the top.

(3) The following three features of the reorganization deserve special mention. First, the new regime is clearly at pains/ it continues an effort, under way for some time, to strengthen its control over the military and to bid for its loyalty. As is seen by the prominent role

*This should be read in conjunction with the Special Intelligence Estimate of the situation (SE-29, March 12, 1953).

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~~given to military men and particularly by the Zhukov assignment,~~ 7 Second, the recently criticized internal security apparatus has been consolidated and placed for all to see in the hands of the most experienced and ruthless policeman of them all--Beria. Third, there has been an extensive regrouping and consolidation of industrial and transportation and economic ministries, with control being placed in the hands of a few lieutenants.

(4) The initial pronouncements by the new regime stressed the leading role played by the Great Russian people. ~~This suggests that the regime will continue to base its physical and ideological strength on the Great Russians and that~~ 7 The funeral speeches emphasized the multinational character of the USSR. Thus the regime may fear that the non-Russian Republics as well as the satellite states are of doubtful reliability and may have to be held in line by increasingly tight measures of repression. The fact that Stalin was a Georgian and Malenkov is a Great Russian may have symbolic significance in this connection. However, the peoples of the Soviet Union are definitely not playing a major role in the situation.

(5) Beyond this, there is nothing at the present time which suggests a change, or the nature of a change if one is contemplated, in the conduct of foreign and domestic policies. Barring the drastic intensification of internal or external strains there appears little likelihood of such changes at an early date.

c. On the other hand, the very rapidity with which the transfer of power has been effected, the nature of this change, and the stringency of the controls that have been imposed, together with the speed with which Stalin is to be interred and the warnings against "disorder and panic" (an extraordinarily revealing quote from Pravda), suggest that nervousness and concern over the stability of the new regime are prevalent at the highest levels and that, as regards Malenkov particularly, the effort to consolidate both the power of the regime and his control over it is the overriding preoccupation.

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d. It is probably safe to assume, therefore, that the regime hopes to avoid serious external difficulties until it has consolidated its power or unless a struggle for power develops in such a way that one aspirant or another sees an opportunity to advance his interests by pursuing an aggressive and adventurous course. However, it is also in the nature of such a new regime that it must display its hardness or, to state it negatively, that it must avoid any sign of weakness. On balance, therefore, it is concluded that:

(1) the regime is unlikely to undertake any rash actions or dramatic new initiatives for some time.

(2) the new rules are likely to be more "royalist than the King" in adhering rigidly for the time being to the policies laid down by Stalin.

(3) the new rulers will react promptly, sharply, and perhaps even excessively to any external threats.

e. The evidence available to date suggests that the regime may be particularly concerned about:

(1) the loyalty and subservience of the satellite regimes.

(2) relations with Communist China.

[42] (3) the loyalty of the army.

[43] (4) internal security.

[44] (5) the attitudes of minority nationalities in the USSR.

(6) party control of government and police; close ties between party and people.

f. Regardless of its overt attitudes toward the outside world, the basic concern of the new regime and of Malenkov in particular is with the consolidation of the internal position. ~~It is probable, moreover, that barring serious external problems of such a new character that they are not covered by the policies established by Stalin, serious friction within the regime is more likely to arise over domestic issues than over any other issues.~~ Serious friction within the regime over external issues is most likely to arise where such issues are too novel to be adequately covered by policies already established by Stalin.

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3/13/535. Strategic Concept.

a. The plan for psychological operations must be drawn up within the context of a strategic concept. Although its formulation is beyond the scope of this paper, it has been necessary to outline the main features of a strategic concept as a basis for the psychological plan. If this concept is revised, the plan for psychological operations will have to be revised accordingly.

b. Aims. In accordance with our fundamental objectives and as the most promising ways of making real progress toward these objectives, our basic aims in the present situation are to use the opportunities presented by Stalin's death and the difficulties inherent in the transfer of power to new hands:

With-respect-to the communist system:

(1) -to promote fission within-the-regime at-the top;
(2) -to promote division-between-the-Soviet Union and Communist China;-

(3) -to-promote-division between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European-satellites;

(4) -to-promote-conflict between major power or-interest-groups within-the-Soviet Union;

With-respect-to the free-world:

(5) -to promote strength-and-unity;
(6) -to develop and maintain-confidence in-U. S.-leadership of-the-free world;

(7) -to disintegrate-Communist-strength.7

Version A:

(1) To involve the new Soviet regime in major and difficult decisions of policy calculated to exploit the differences of interest and purpose among those who now hold portions of Soviet power, while avoiding pressures which would tend to unite them.

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(2) To press a clear and fresh vision of American purposes on the Soviet and satellite peoples designed to associate their aspirations more explicitly with our own.

(3) To unify the Free World around positive and sustained efforts to seek the peace, and around a clarified conception of purposes common to our allies, the "neutrals" and our selves.

(4) To provide a new and more firm base within the United States for the pursuit of American interests and objectives.7

/Version B.

(1) To foster any and all divisive forces within the top hierarchy of the Kremlin with particular reference to the Malenkov-Beria-Molotov-Bulganin situation.

(2) To stimulate divisive forces between the Kremlin and the satellite governments including Communist China.

(3) To maximize the disaffection between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Malenkov.

(4) To maximize the division between the peoples of the satellites, including Communist China, and Malenkov.

(5) To maintain and increase unity between the governmental leaders of the free nations.

(6) To maintain and increase the unity between the peoples of the free nations.

(7) To follow through successfully in the Defense Building of the U.S. and the other free nations.

(8) To attain a sound economic position for the U.S. and the other free nations with widespread confidence in President Eisenhower's economic leadership.7

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c. Assets.

(1) The greatest asset we have for all of these purposes is the dynamic effective personality and position of President Eisenhower in the United States.

(2) The second greatest asset is the diplomatic leadership we have in all international agencies, spearheaded by Secretary of State Dulles and U.N. Representative Lodge.

(3) The third greatest asset is our military potential, including atomic weapons with deterring force and consequent feeling of relative greater security on the part of those who associate with us.

(4) The fourth greatest asset is our economic strength with our tremendous production and our capacity to assist others.

d. Our greatest liabilities are:

(1) A natural tendency on the part of other free nations to resent U.S. top dog position.

(2) Difficulty in maintaining the impetus of defense building in the face of understanding desires for lower taxes, less military service, social security.

(3) Danger of attitude of complete dependence of other free nations upon U.S. defense and economic strength.

(4) Uneasiness of our associates as to our own long-term economic and political objectives.

(5) Our heritage of heavy debts and mistakes from previous years.

e. [c] Methods.

(1) Main effort: strategy of choice. One of the most significant means of furthering the above aims is to confront the communist rulers with difficult major choices in a way that tends to isolate them and divide their counsels, while uniting humanity, especially the free world, with us. The Presidential speech assumed above, should serve this purpose.

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3/13/53(2) Supporting efforts.

With respect to the communist world:

(a) We should overload the untried regime with other stimuli apt to provoke internal arguments--e.g., occasions requiring decision, or failures leading to recrimination -- but avoid threats or sabre-rattling.

(b) We should plague it with doubts--e.g., about reliability of key individuals and groups.

(c) We should foster internal antagonisms by other suitable means, such as fostering nationalistic feelings.

(d) We should combine "carrot" and "stick" both in direct support of the main effort and in executing the other supporting efforts. An essential feature of the strategy of choice is a "push-pull" situation, combining pressures and inducements which show the disadvantages of a choice contrary to our interests and the advantages of one which is favorable.

(e) Fluctuations in direction and emphasis (e.g., between carrot and stick) should be used as an added means of confusion except where steadiness of tactics is desirable for a special reason.

(f) Probing (see d(2) below).

With respect to the free world:

(g) The most promising ways of furthering our aims with respect to the free world are:

(1) to stress the importance of increased strength and unity by emphasizing the new elements of danger and opportunity in the situation.

(2) to manifest a willingness and desire to cooperate in developing unity of effort by the free world. In this connection it will be desirable to approach our allies in a spirit of give and take.

(h) We should exploit the possible weakening of ties between the Kremlin and Communist parties throughout the world due to Malenkov's lack of stature, experience and ideological prowess as the new leader of world communism.

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3/13/53f. d.7 Phases

(1) Initial spurt. During the next few weeks, much risk and expenditure are justified in order to prolong and make the most of the condition of nervousness following the sudden transfer of power. The Presidential speech is assumed above, specially for this reason.

(2) Follow-up. It is most important that the spurt, particularly the Main Effort, should not be left as one-shot operation. Above all, an adequate "stick" should be ready for the expected Soviet evasion of the initial "carrot" of the Presidential speech. Every energy must be employed to make all seeds of disunity grow. For this purpose, many actions even if unlikely to produce great effect will be desirable for purpose of probing to find out where the seeds are sprouting. If events evolve very favorably, this phase could eventuate in a

(3) Climax in which the communist system breaks into open internal conflict. This third phase in our strategy should begin if and when such conflict seems near. If it never comes, the strategy should still have contributed usefully to our basic purpose.

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PART II

PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. The importance of psychological pressures in the present situation is of sufficient moment to warrant not only the concentration of all psychological media upon the stated objectives, but also the resolute development of expanded and more effective capabilities. Even more essential, perhaps, is the determination to seize and consistently maintain the initiative through psychological operations imaginatively conceived and dramatically executed. Before it can win the hearts or influence the intellects of its targets, United States psychological strategy must capture their imaginations.

b. The major hope of fulfilling the aims of this plan lies in substantive government acts of psychological significance. The Presidential speech assumed in Part I, para. 3.d. is the keystone upon which the present psychological strategy is based. This assumed speech, and the various official actions which would stem directly from it, need, however, to be complemented by a series of psychologically significant acts. In Part-III is a list of suggested possible actions of psychological value.* All but a few of the overt and covert psychological programs proposed in the following paragraphs of this section are intended primarily to exploit, prolong and intensify the psychological impact of various political, economic and military actions comparable in their effect to those assumed or suggested in the plan.*

c. For administrative reasons the present plan merely summarizes the broad outlines of the effort called for in the field of covert operations, but it assumes that this effort will be adequate in its

* Should be deleted if Part III is deleted.

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material scale, and sufficiently energetic and imaginative in its approach, to justify heavy reliance--second only to that placed upon official actions upon the clandestine arm in achieving the aims of the plan.

As to general direction, the covert effort will be guided by the following general considerations:

In covert operations we should be guided in the propaganda field chiefly by test of plausibility. Within this limitation there should be broad scope and wide latitude of action in this field; and in the political action field we shall, as usual, be guided by national objectives and the necessity of avoiding provocation to a point where solidification of the Soviet regime or a response by force might result. Our covert propaganda should not be concerned with consistency, either as regards themes or as between areas, so long as care is exercised to avoid actions which would be mutually self-cancelling or which would tend to undermine or discredit significant overt actions.

Covert information operations should develop plausible material to be picked up and reported factually by overt information media.

Clandestine activities should be directed at the goal of applying pressure at many points by harassment and the sowing of doubt, confusion and suspicion. It is recognized that the most profitable areas of operations will probably be:

- (1) inducement of defections of Soviet and satellite officials by covert pressures;

- (2) sowing of confusion and uncertainty in the ranks of the Communist parties in the satellite areas and the free world.

The covert arms of the Government will nevertheless be alert to any possibilities of reaching the ruling groups of the USSR themselves and creating suspicion, uncertainty and pressure.

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d. While the possibilities for rapid increase in capabilities and effectiveness of our overt information programs is limited--the scale of the present effort is already considerable--these programs are also called upon to play a vital role in the implementation of the plan and the need for maximum energy, initiative and resourcefulness in developing the broad tasks listed below is no less great than in the case of covert operations.

In the situation with which this paper deals, all governments and all peoples of the world may be assumed to be deeply interested, first, in accurate reporting and interpretation of events in the Soviet Union and their consequences and, second, in the relationship of the United States to the situation and its intentions and its actions with regard to it. Therefore, a primary responsibility falling upon official overt information media is to provide widespread factual coverage and reliable commentary, from original and attributable sources, on developments, including the statement of the President crystallizing the attitude of the United States. This is the essential foundation upon which effective propaganda will rest.

Successful use of overt media in the operation will require careful coordination of all media. Of a special importance will be the coordination of public statements, since such statements are the most effective weapons for overt use. The watch committee envisaged in this plan must be specifically charged with alerting overt media in advance to forthcoming actions and their significance. (For example, should a public statement be intended to launch a "trial balloon", the overt media should be advised in order to give it maximum dissemination.)

e. In our covert as well as our overt propaganda played to many areas, much should be made of the fact that the Soviet system has suffered an irreparable loss of strength through the death of Stalin and that this is a time for purposeful, determined and united action on the part of the West.

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f. With the change in regime, defection deserves a high priority in both overt and covert media. The principal role of overt media in this work is, of course, not the direct inducement of defection but such indirect assistance as publicizing defections when they occur.

g. Congressional and publication leaders should be taken in on the operation of the peace offensive and on the imperative necessity of maintaining our defense-building impetus.

h. This plan should be under constant review in light of the developing situation.

2. Overt Information Media by Areas.

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a. To the Soviet Union. In addition to standard themes, official overt media should seek to accomplish the following tasks:

(1) To throw doubt on the stability of the new regime at the top. In this connection it will be useful to cite history and contemporary experts on Soviet affairs, such as Tito and former Communists, to rubish reports of former escapees who have been in the Communist apparatus telling about former plots against each other between the four top Kremlin men, to show that a despotism requires a despot, to suggest that Malenkov has not brought all the power factors under his control and to indicate that the new arrangements will not work, with the result that a struggle for power, complete with purges, is inevitable.

(2) To provide useful advice to Soviet citizens on how to survive in this dangerous and unsettled time, thus contributing to the psychology of individual caution impairing the efficiency of the system.

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(3) To exploit the fact that the reorganization of the Soviet government and the Communist Party closely parallels that during World War II and to question why this is necessary in view of the Soviet claim to have the overwhelming support of the Soviet peoples. This theme should not be used in any way suggestive of a danger that a general war may soon break out.

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(4) To convey an impression that the attitude of the United States Government is one of "sharp watchfulness" and of awareness that the situation contains new elements of danger which, if they materialize, we will meet firmly, and possibly of new elements of hope, justifying a careful review of United States policies.

(5) When an approach to the Soviet Government by the United States Government is made public, to exploit it intensively in order to portray the serious purpose behind this action to achieve a lessening of international tensions and, in the event that it is not successful, to place the responsibility squarely on the USSR.

(6) To exploit the fact that there has been an obvious effort on the part of the new Soviet regime to buy off the military by giving it more and higher representation than it had before and to cast doubt on the success of this effort.

(7) To report factually suggestions from American and Western military men and other prominent persons (but not top administration officials) who have had experience with the Soviet military that perhaps it may be easier to come to sensible arrangements with a regime in which these men have enhanced power and influence. (Such suggestions might be covertly elicited.)

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(8) To place increased emphasis upon the role of the United States and other free nations in providing sanctuary and a new life of opportunity and freedom to escapees from Soviet communist tyranny. The idea that the present may provide the best opportunity to escape should be addressed particularly to the Russian-speaking audience in Eastern Germany and to Soviet officials outside the Soviet orbit. Be alert for and immediately publicize in dramatic extensive terms all defections of Red Army personnel and of Communist Party members and widely herald their escape across the line with pictures and interviews.

(9) To implant doubt of the loyalty of the satellite leaders to the new Moscow regime.

(10) To report factually any indications of divergence of policies or interests between satellites or Communist China and the Soviet Union. (Such indications might be the result of covert operations, provided these operations produce plausible indications.)

(11) Play up apparent personal coolness between Malenkov and Mao in such a way as to suggest that they dislike each other so intensely that the two leaders are loath to meet each other.

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(12) To provide renewed evidence of the peaceful intentions of the free world by exploiting expressions of friendship for the Soviet peoples and such offers as may be made for the peaceful resolution of outstanding differences.

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3/13/53b. To the Satellites of Eastern Europe.

In the light of factual reporting and reliable interpretation of the events in the USSR and their consequences elsewhere, official overt media should carry out in the satellites of Eastern Europe the following tasks:

(1) To maintain and to invigorate the profound national, including religious, sentiments that have been stimulated by the events in the USSR.

(2) To recollect in detail the indignity and the exploitation to which the peoples of the satellites have been subjected as the result of their subjugation to the interests of the Kremlin, together with the encouragement of the belief that their lot will be harder rather than easier under the new, inexperienced and insecure regime.

(3) To portray the United States as a strong, reliable power, whose official declarations are to be taken as being serious, weighty proposals for advancing the cause of freedom without general war.

(4) To maintain in the minds of the leaders of the satellites, all proteges to one degree or another of the dead tyrant, doubts as to their relationships with the new masters of Kremlin, together with encouragement of the consideration that their survival may depend upon a new regard for popular nationalist sentiments.

(5) To recollect the successful deviation of Tito, the successful collaboration of Yugoslavia as an independent state with Greece and Turkey and with the powers of the West and the potential significance of a Balkan Entente.

(6) To suggest to subordinate officials that an opportunity may soon be at hand to advance their personal ambitions at the expense of their superiors.

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(7) To remind that the United States does not return escapees from countries behind the Iron Curtain.

(8) To discourage excessive hopes and consequent rash actions on the part of the general population that might expose patriotic citizens to vigorous reprisals at the hands of uneasy leaders.

(9) To disparage the stature of current leaders in the USSR and the satellites on the ground that Mao has now become the leading theoretician and revolutionary leader of international communism.

c. To Communist China.

In addition to standard themes, official overt media should carry out the following tasks:

(1) To promote friction at all levels and eventually fission between Chinese and Soviet communist leadership by indicating, among other things, that the Chinese Communists are tools of the Kremlin.

(2) Specifically to promote rivalry and friction between Chinese and Soviet Communist Party apparatuses in Southeast and Southern Asia.

(3) To foment disunity between Moscow and Peking regarding the continuation of the Korean War, portraying a growing determination in the United States to bring the Korean War to an end, by force if necessary, by planting doubt whether the Soviet regime, in the period while it is trying to consolidate its power, will back up the Chinese Communists in the event the United States takes more forceful action to end the Korean War, and by planting doubt about the stability of the new Soviet regime and particularly about Malenkov's ability to gather all the power factors under his control and to give ideological leadership

(4) To exploit ideological differences and rivalry between Mao and Moscow.

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(5) To play up Mao's conception of Malenkov as an ideological inferior and build up Mao as the real heir of Lenin.

(6) To create doubt of validity of agreements and commitments made by Stalin to Mao--especially as regards aid for the Korean War, this based on theory that Mao was Stalin's man.

(7) To encourage the belief that the Soviet Union is holding back material assistance in order to keep the People's Republic militarily and economically dependent.

d. To Yugoslavia.

In the light of the experience of Tito with the Soviet regime, his defection in 1948, and his implacable hostility not simply to the dead tyrant but to the whole system embodied in the Kremlin and the Cominform, small need exists for official overt media in output to Yugoslavia to labor the significance of events in the USSR. At the same time, the example and the posture at Yugoslavia at the present moment are extremely significant, particularly to the satellites of Eastern Europe and to a less degree to Communist China, and recollection of the successful deviation, the increasing collaboration with other free states on a basis of mutual respect and independence and the potential of Balkan Entente may be effectively exploited among them. With regard to Yugoslavia itself official overt media have the following tasks:

(1) To encourage the pride of the Yugoslavs in the fact that they escaped the domination of the Kremlin and the disagreeable consequences at present events in the USSR.

(2) To recall the mutually beneficial results of past collaboration with the United States and other free nations and to develop confidence in the security to be derived from similar collaboration in the future.

(3) To develop assurance in the power, the reliability and the seriousness of the United States as the leader of the free world in the situation now created.

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e. To Western Europe (including Germany).

Overt media to Western Europe should have primarily the following tasks:

- (1) To emphasize that the threat to the free world has not been lessened.
- (2) to stress the need for prompt ratification of EDC and otherwise furthering NATO objectives.
- (3) to point out the ~~possible dangers~~ weakness in a situation where Malenkov is no Stalin in political experience, ideological leadership or party and state authority and control. Even if he is or becomes the political boss, he is not the high priest. (Caution: Do Not imply that there is immediate danger of war).
- (4) to raise questions concerning the stability of the new regime.
- (5) to stimulate confidence in the steadiness and reliability of the United States in its role of leadership in the free world.
- (6) to question whether local communist parties can now look to Moscow for anything. Malenkov is a product of the Soviet bureaucracy with little or no knowledge of foreign countries who cares nothing for the fate of the communists there.
- (7) to ask who is now the preeminent theoretician and spokesman for world communism--Mao or Malenkov.
- (8) to cite the decay of the arts, science and culture of the USSR during Malenkov's rise to power.

f. To the Near and Middle East.

In view of the lack of appreciation generally prevailing in the area concerning the menace of Soviet Communism, official overt media in output to the Arab States have the following tasks:

- (1) To emphasize that while the tyrant is gone, the tyranny with all its imperial ambitions remains.
- (2) to demonstrate that the national aspirations of the nations of the area will not be furthered by a cessation of pressure from the USSR,

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even if it took place, but only through termination of the disputes in the area, elimination of sources of internal tensions, adjustment of differences with the West and the building of adequate defensive strength.

(3) to exploit the confusion and the uncertainty that is likely to beset Communist organizations and affiliated bodies in the area.

(4) to seize every opportunity to enhance the repute and the standing in the area of the United States and, as appropriate, its allies.

(5) to stress the Soviet record with minority groups, including factual material on Moslem purges of the '30's.

g. To Free Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Indochina, Korea, Formosa and Japan).

To the extent that the belief spreads in Free Asia that conditions within the USSR may cease a relaxation of its pressures, to the same extent lead it to be less aggressive, support may diminish for the measures necessary to prosecute the conflicts fight communists in Korea, in Indochina and in Malaya. A special problem may arise with regard to the Overseas Chinese, outside Formosa, who, to the extent that they may be led to believe that the change in the USSR weakens ties between it and the Chinese Communist regime, may be inclined to look more favorably on Mao, as being a nationalist leader rather than as one partner in a global communist conspiracy a tool of Moscow. Another special problem may arise in connection with Communist Parties and their affiliates in the area; in sowing doubt and confusion among them, care must be taken to avoid causing other to come to regard them as paper tigers consider the communist menace less serious than it has been.

The following major tasks therefore fall on official overt media in output to the area:

(1) Emphasizing that the change of command in the USSR involves no change in the character, the capabilities or the intentions of the regime.

(2) emphasizing that, although the role attitude of Mao may be changed by events in the USSR, proof of it will be shown by deeds in Korea, in Indochina and elsewhere, including Communist China itself, and not by words.

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(3) Emphasizing that national aspirations in the area will not be achieved as the result of fortuitous events elsewhere, but only by hard, strenuous effort by each nation in the area and by individuals within it.

h. Latin America

In Latin America evidence of doubt, confusion, and mistrust caused by events in the USSR and in Communist parties elsewhere may be exploited to embarrass the Communist parties and their affiliates in the area.

Official overt media therefore have the following tasks:

(1) To emphasize the continuing character of the Soviet regime, regardless of its leadership, especially its lust for power, its ignorance of the world, its abasement of culture, its perversion of education, its scorn of religion and its utilization of anti-Semitism.

(2) to identify and expose Communist and fellow-travelers making early pilgrimages to Moscow.

(3) to expose evidence of subservience to the Kremlin on the part of cultural, professional and labor organizations, especially of an international character.

(4) to identify and expose political leadership subservient to the Kremlin.

(5) to exhort the non-Communist and non-Extreme-Leftist opposition parties to bestir themselves because of the probable confusion in the local Communist high command.

(6) to exhort the non-Communist and non-Leftist regimes, some of which appear to be in a precarious position, to a show of anti-Communist strength, taking measures that they might have been afraid to take prior to Stalin's death.

(7) to foster doubt among the Communists and Leftists groups themselves as to the solidity of the present Communist regime. (Malenkov may be the political boss, but he is not the high priest, and Communist cells not contiguous to Russia itself or Russian satellites, depended for their power as much on the Stalin mystique as on anything else, and that mystique is gone.

(8) To encourage and comfort the Christian, law-abiding, peace-hoping people.

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1. Operations Involving National Security Policy.

Probably the greatest psychological impact we can produce on the Soviet regime is that derived from decisions on United States preparedness. Apparent acceleration of our military buildup, stepped up training schedules, larger field exercises, the unofficial issuance of statements of pride on military readiness, or reassignment of military units in a pattern suggesting a readiness move, would all tend to convince the Soviet regime of our firmness and the danger of a "bold" Soviet policy. To avoid disturbing our allies such statements and moves would have to be directed to limited areas, and should not be blatantly aggressive.

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2. Operations Involving Military Relations with Allied and Friendly Countries.

a. Second only to decisions and actions with reference to the United States Military Establishment, joint decisions and actions with our allies to increase our readiness to meet any new dangers will have a profound psychological impact in the Soviet regime. New staff talks with the Yugoslavs, Greeks and Turks, increased shipments to NATO, etc., would require most careful consideration in the Kremlin.

b. A fleet visit and aerial demonstrations in the immediate future for the Near and Middle East would have psychological impact. Specifically, United States forces could pass through the Suez Canal and pay courtesy calls on such men as Naguib. The fleet could proceed to conduct similar visits throughout the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf area.

c. Consideration being given to the assignment of even token forces to the Near and Middle East would, if effected have a favorable psychological impact within this area itself, and would also pose a problem to the Soviet regime.

3. Operations Involving United Nations Actions in Korea.

a. Considerable pressure could be brought to bear on the Kremlin, and on the Sino-Soviet relationship, if the United States were wholly non-attributably:

(1) To inspire the development of a movement among the Prisoners of War in Korea for association into a Volunteer Freedom Corps to fight against the tyranny in their homeland culminating in a petition to the United States Military Commander that they be permitted to join the Forces of Chiang Kai-Shek or the UNC troops;

(2) to inspire a direct suggestion from Chiang Kai-Shek for volunteers from among CCF prisoners to join his forces in Formosa.

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(3) to step up noticeably preparations for an offensive in Korea during the next several months with overt acts, such as expanded training exercises, stepped up probing actions, by publicized movement of forces if possible, apparently expanded logistics supplies to Korea, the reinforcement of Naval forces in local waters, and further public discussion of extended air actions.

This concept of action need not pre-suppose that they must be consummated in the sense of enlarging the Korean war. They are conceived as methods of suggesting or implying pressures on the Soviet Orbit in Korea, and are designed to confuse, overload and delay the policy machinery in the Kremlin and in China.

b. Increased harassment of Soviet or Chinese shipping for its psychological effect could also be considered. Legal attachment of lend lease ships engaged in traffic to Far Eastern ports when in neutral ports would add to the burdens of the regime.

4. Operations Involving Political Considerations.

a. The establishment of a Volunteer Freedom Corps, whose ranks are open to all those who oppose tyranny, and who are willing to accept the leadership of the free nations of the world in determining when and whether resort to force is required, would pose another problem.

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b. The Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe, could propose the establishment of a world-wide fund drawn from contributions from military personnel for the erection of a suitable memorial commemorating the dead of both sides in World War II to be erected at the site of the signing of the World War II armistice in Paris or Berlin.

The memorial could be described as a shrine to peace, sponsored by those who have the best reason to wish for peace--the military. The Soviets should be invited to participate perhaps through a direct appeal from senior United States officers to their acquaintances in the Soviet Army, and when the memorial is erected they should be invited to attend the dedication. If this offer is accepted the United States will have an opportunity to seize the initiative in the peace campaign, and if rejected, the Soviets may be embarrassed on a world-wide scale.

c. The United States Delegation to the United Nations could urge the directors and governing bodies of specialized agencies, particularly UNESCO, WHO, and FAO to issue appeals for return or active participation of the Soviet Union to these humanitarian and peaceful organizations. The directors of these organizations could be encouraged to attempt to visit Moscow for this end. The United States might also give consideration to sponsoring a resolution to this effect in the General Assembly.

d. The United States could urge Nehru to send a high-level representative to Peiping--or if possible to go himself--to explore the possibilities of a Korean settlement. Or the United States could urge some neutral, such as Nehru, to propose a new complete cease-fire in Korea on land, sea, and air; and new conference; to which the United States could promptly reply and express willingness to do so.

5. Operations Involving Diplomatic Activity with the Soviet Regime.

a. The United States could officially propose, perhaps upon the occasion of the assignment of a new ambassador, that both nations remove their restrictions on the travel of diplomatic personnel.

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b. In the interest of providing greater opportunities for compromise of diplomatic personnel, the number of invitations to official and unofficial social gatherings of certain selected representatives could be increased. This type of effort could be expanded into other fields, for example, by personal letters from outstanding personalities of the free world to members of the new Soviet set-up, seeking to renew old acquaintanceship or conceivably to extend invitations to visit, etc. Thus, General Bradley might write to General Zhukov and possibly Mr. Stassen might write to Mikovan.

c. Consideration might once again be given to the psychological potential of actively attempting as feasible to secure the defection of carefully selected diplomatic and official personnel, or failing that, to compromise such individuals, or failing that to utilize existing regulations as grounds for declaring them persona-non-grata. Such a program would be conceived only as a deliberate program of harrassment.

d. The United States might inspire, in conjunction with Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and perhaps Moslem leaders, a world religious conference in Europe for the purpose of developing world religious solidarity. Such a program could also be directly aimed against the threat to religion posed by Communism.

e. At some future date, the Secretary of State could propose a meeting in Berlin between Beria and the Under Secretary of State and the Director for the purpose of arranging for the safe conduct and orderly passage of those who wish to leave the Soviet Union to come out into the Western World and there be absorbed with a multi-nation economic refugee plan. Beria's leaving the center of power, and even the consideration of it, would increase uneasiness and suspicion, and at the same time the humanitarian interest in refugees, with its special appeal to many groups in the free nations, are all apparent.

6. Economic Operations

a. The United States might announce new economic assistance for certain countries in the Middle East.

Comment by

Economic warfare deserves a high priority in both overt and covert fields. There are many things that can and should be done.

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